



The relation between content providers and distributors: Lessons 
from the regulation of television distribution in the United 
Kingdom
Michalis, M. and Smith, P.
 
NOTICE: this is the authors’ version of a work that was accepted for publication in 
Telematics and Informatics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as 
peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control 
mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to 
this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently 
published in Telematics and Informatics, 33 (2) 665-673.
Telematics and Informatics is available online at:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2015.07.001
© 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk




[p. 665] The relation between content providers and distributors: Lessons 
from the regulation of television distribution in the United Kingdom 
 
Maria Michalisa, Paul Smith b, 
a Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Westminster, Harrow Campus, Northwick 
Park, London HA1 3TP, UK 
b Leicester Media School, Faculty of Technology, De Montfort University, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK 
 
Accepted for publication: 7 July 2015 
 
Abstract  
Using the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study, this article analyses the growing 
commercial and regulatory significance of broadcaster-distributor relations within the 
contemporary television industry. The first part of the article argues that despite important 
changes in broadcast delivery technology, more recently shaped by the growth of the Internet, 
and the associated growth of options of receiving television content, the traditional delivery 
platforms (digital terrestrial, satellite and cable) remain by far the preferred choice for 
viewers in Britain. At the same time, public service broadcasters continue to be the biggest 
investors in domestic original non-sport content and account for over half of all television 
viewing. The strength of PSBs in content and their growing reliance on commercial 
proprietary subscription platforms (cable and satellite) and gradually on the Internet presents 
challenges in the nexus between broadcasters and distributors. The article focuses on the 
debate over retransmission fees between PSBs and Sky, and on the question of whether Sky 
should be required to offer some of its premium content to rival pay-TV platforms. These two 
examples highlight the impact regulatory intervention can have on the balance of power 
between broadcasters and distributors. The article concludes that such debates concerning the 
commercial relations between content providers and distributors will remain pivotal and 
become more heated given that similar issues are raised in the Internet environment. 
 
Keywords: UK television regulation, retransmission fees, Pay-TV, Ofcom, Public service 
broadcasting  
  
 1. Introduction  
Understanding the television industry in the United Kingdom (UK) used to be fairly 
straightforward. Until the 1990s, there were three terrestrial broadcasters – the BBC, ITV and 
Channel Four – each with reasonably well defined, albeit slightly different, public service 
remits, and two main sources of funding: either a compulsory licence fee paid by television 
owning households (the BBC) or the sale of advertising time (ITV and Channel Four). By 
contrast, the contemporary UK television landscape has become increasingly marketized and 
far more complex. Specifically, over the last couple of decades or so there has been an 
enormous increase in the number of channels (and/or aggregated audio-visual content) 
available to viewers via a range of new delivery technologies, such as satellite and digital 
television, as well as, most recently, the Internet. Just as, if [p. 666] not more significantly, 
these technological developments have been accompanied (and often driven by) the 
emergence of a new and increasingly significant source of revenue, namely subscription 
payments from viewers. At least partly as a result, a key feature of the contemporary UK 
television industry is the increased commercial and regulatory significance of the relationship 
between broadcasters (i.e. channel owners and/or content aggregators) and distributors (i.e. 
owners and/or controllers of key delivery platforms).   
 
When spectrum scarcity limited the number of available channels, power and profit were 
chiefly located in control of distribution, rather than content production (Garnham, 1987). 
However, as the number of delivery options for broadcasters has increased, the dominant 
position of distributors could be seen to have lessened, while at the same time the commercial 
power of broadcasters who produce or control popular content has increased (Christophers, 
2008). Consequently, the balance of power between broadcasters and distributors in the 
contemporary television industry is much less clear. Rather than inherently favouring the 
dominance of broadcasters by distributors, distributor-broadcaster relations are more clearly 
characterised by a mutual dependence. On the one hand, to reach viewers (and, in case of 
pay-TV broadcasters, often to receive a small share of the subscription revenue paid by 
viewers to delivery platform operators), broadcasters still require access to the leading 
delivery platforms, such as Freeview (terrestrial), Sky Digital (satellite) or Virgin Media 
(cable) in the UK. On the other hand, however, to ensure the competitiveness of their delivery 
platform, rival platform operators require access to the most popular channels/content, most 
notably Hollywood movies and live premium sport for pay-TV platforms. Moreover, 
established and emerging market concentration further complicates the broadcasting-
 distribution relation as well as the broader competitive dynamics in the market. For instance, 
Sky has always been a broadcaster and a distributor. The vertically integrated Sky is under a 
regulatory obligation to provide fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to its platform 
in order that it does not favour own and affiliated services at the expense of competing 
services (see below). Against this background, rather than a simple linear power relationship 
with a definite winner and loser, the balance of power between broadcasters and distributors 
can be best seen as shaped by specific market and regulatory conditions (Evens and Donders, 
2013). It is with this in mind that the remainder of the article provides a detailed analysis of 
the relationship between broadcasters and distributors in the contemporary UK television 
industry. 
 
The first part of the article sets out in more detail how recent developments in broadcast 
delivery technology have led to a growth in the number of ways of receiving television 
services for viewers. This section highlights the continued importance of the traditional 
television delivery platforms, namely Freeview (digital terrestrial), Sky Digital (satellite) and 
Virgin Media (cable). It also draws attention to the potentially powerful position of Sky 
within UK broadcasting as a highly successful vertically integrated distributor-broadcaster. 1 
Drawing on a wide range of primary documents produced by the UK government, regulators 
and industry policy stakeholders, the second part of the article focuses on two high profile 
(and ongoing) case studies in the regulation of television distribution in the UK: first, the 
dispute between public service broadcasters2 (PSBs) and Sky over commercial terms for the 
distribution of their channels/services via its Sky Digital satellite delivery platform; and, 
secondly, the imposition of a Wholesale Must-Offer (WMO) obligation on Sky by the UK’s 
communication regulator, Ofcom, in relation to the supply of its two principal premium 
sports channels (Sky Sports 1 and 2) to rival pay-TV platforms. Both of these cases 
demonstrate how, over the last decade or so, changing market conditions have had an impact 
on distributor-broadcaster relations, which, in turn, have led to increased calls for legal and/or 
regulatory intervention, Furthermore, these two examples have been selected because they 
highlight the impact regulatory intervention (or even just the threat of regulatory intervention) 
can have on the balance of power between broadcasters and distributors in the case of either a 
dominate distributor or a dominate broadcaster (or both).Overall, the UK case illustrates that 
                                                
1	  Until November 2014, Sky was known as British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB), but to avoid confusion is 
referred to throughout in this article as Sky. 
2 The main public service broadcasters in Britain are the licence-fee funded BBC and the commercially funded 
ITV, Channel Four and Channel Five.  
 the regulation of television distribution is an increasingly important policy tool for 
government to use in pursuit of public interest objectives, such as increased funding for PSBs 
or greater competition within the pay-TV market. As a result, the UK case may well provide 
a valuable reference point for other countries with similar market structures seeking to 
achieve the same policy goals. More generally, and perhaps more significantly, the UK 
example also highlights the underlying point that the ability of governments to shape the 
nature of the television industry did not disappear with the ending of spectrum scarcity. On 
the contrary, through the regulation of distributor-broadcaster relations policy makers and 
regulators retain a potential means to achieve most, if not quite all, of their policy objectives. 
It is this lesson that makes the regulation of UK television distribution a salient case for both 
those outside the UK and/or those with interests related to the future of the media industries 
more generally.  
 
 
2. Developments in UK Television Distribution  
Television broadcasting has always been about audiovisual content as well as audience access 
to it (Michalis, 2014). Over the last decade or so, due to a combination of technological, 
market and policy developments, issues relating to distribution and control of networks have 
become an ever increasingly important part of the TV industry and its regulation.  
 
Following the proliferation of channels with the emergence of cable and satellite analogue 
platforms in the 1980s and the subsequent rise of strong pay-television operators, the UK 
media and communications market has experienced more fundamental transformations in 
recent years, notably the completion of the switchover process from analogue to digital 
television in 2012; the rise of broadband Internet supporting IP delivery of audio-visual 
content and the popularity of connected and [p. 667] portable consumer devices (Ofcom, 
2014a: 2). All these developments have radically altered the structure and competitive 
dynamics in television and associated markets. There is now a multitude of media outlets 
(delivery mechanisms) and consumer equipment through which one can access television 
material. 
 
 Yet paradoxically, despite higher penetration of broadband Internet, the rapid take-up of 
connected devices, and increased competition for audience attention,3 television viewing has 
remained robust at just under 4 hours per day in 2013 (Ofcom, 2014c: 6). More crucially, TV 
consumption patterns have proved resilient. The three traditional digital television platforms - 
namely Freeview (terrestrial), Sky Digital (satellite) and Virgin Media (cable) - remain the 
main means of accessing television content. Two of them - the free-to-air Freeview and the 
subscription platform Sky Digital - have polarised the market. In 2014, these two platforms 
accounted for nearly 80 per cent of households, with the remaining 20 per cent subscribing to 
Virgin Media (Mediatique, 2014: 16, 65). BT’s hybrid DTT and IPTV platform has yet to 
make great market inroads. As of mid-2014, seven years after its entry into the television 
market and roughly a year after the launch of the BT Sport channel, BT TV had just over one 
million subscribers, similar to TalkTalk’s subscribers (the second hybrid DTT/IPTV 
platform) though the latter has not acquired expensive sport rights making some to question 
whether BT’s investment in sports is paying off (Informitv, 2014).  
 
Most viewing continues to be to linear channels, with adults spending on average three hours 
daily watching live television (Ofcom, 2014c: 8). Although the main five PSBs (BBC1, 
BBC2, ITV, Channel 4, and Channel 5) and their portfolio channels have experienced a 
decline in their audience share, they still account for 72.3 per cent of all viewing and they 
offer 16 of the 20 most watched TV channels (Ofcom, 2014a: 179). In addition, the main 
PSBs account for 43 per cent of all programme spend (Ofcom, 2014c: 166). This large 
proportion is even more significant if one considers that it is pay-tv subscriptions that drive 
growth in total sector revenues. Put differently then, and this point is worth emphasising, 
despite its smaller volume in terms of duration and number of viewers compared to linear 
viewing and despite its lower spend on first-run original non-sport programming compared to 
PSBs, pay-viewing delivers on average higher revenues. According to the latest available 
data, in 2013, pay-tv subscriptions continued to experience the highest growth: revenues grew 
by 6.7 per cent to nearly £5.9bn, making it the first most significant category (46 per cent) of 
TV industry revenue, behind advertising which accounted for 28.6 per cent (Ofcom, 2014c: 
159-161).  
                                                
3	  At the beginning of 2014, 77% of households had broadband Internet 8% - over 6 million – of mobile 
subscriptions were 4G; 61% of adults owned a smartphone (almost the same as laptop ownership) whilst 
household take-up of tablet computers doubled within a year to reach 44%. Penetration of smart TVs increased 
and stood at 12% of households out of which 82% used the TV set to access the Internet (Ofcom, 2014a: 3-4, 
10).	  
  
The expansion of broadband connections underlines the potential of online delivery via the 
open Internet (Over-The-Top, OTT, delivery via an Internet browser or an application) or on 
a managed TV connection (IPTV) to become the fourth distribution platform alongside the 
three traditional ones (terrestrial, cable and satellite). Indicatively, video-on-demand (VoD) 
services are rapidly moving online where a variety of players are present. Many of the OTT 
players offering professional audio-visual content on demand, especially films, are not 
traditional broadcasters and often come from outside Europe like Google’s YouTube. In this 
market, the subscription VoD category experienced strong growth reaching £281m in 2013 
and it continued to be dominated by Netflix (45.1 per cent market share) and Amazon (48.5 
per cent market share). Digital subscriptions (OTT SVoD) increased by 120 per cent year-on-
year and were worth £19m in 2013 compared to the TV-based SVoD which increased by 22 
per cent and reached £85m. (see EAO, 2015: 172) 
 
In 2011, Amazon acquired Lovefilm, the UK’s first legal film download service. It was 
follwed a month later by the entry of Netflix into the OTT subscription VOD market. Netflix 
and Amazon Instant Video (as Amazon renamed Lovefilm in 2014) offer predominantely a 
library of previously broadcast television programmes and movies and as such do not, as yet, 
present a serious threat to traditional broadcasters. More recently, however, both Netflix and 
Amazon have started investing in original content. For instance, Netflix, which produces the 
popular House of Cards and Orange is the New Black series, announced plans to increase its 
original programming three-fold from 2014 to reach 320 hours in 2015 (Steel, 2015). 
Similarly, Amazon has entered TV production through series and children’s animation. In 
addition to their popularity, some of these original productions on streaming services won for 
the first time Golden Globe Awards in 2015 (Netflix’s House of Cards and Amazon’s 
Transparent) (BBC News, 2015).  
 
Traditional broadcasters have responded to these challenges by investing in content and 
platforms. For instance, PSBs continue to invest in original content and at the same time they 
have sought to expand their distribution footprint. The BBC - required to make its services 
universally available, respond to audiences preferences, and promote the take-up of new 
technologies – is available on many platforms with overlapping footprints and delivers 
content in 30 different formats to more than 600 devices (Mediatique 2013: 5, 17). In line 
with PSB values, the BBC prefers open free-to-air platforms which support a horizontal 
 market in consumer equipment and mitigate against powerful gatekeepers. Accordingly, the 
BBC has invested in Freeview, Freesat (the satellite FTA platform) and YouView (the IP-
enabled TV platform) with other industry partners. This strategy allows the BBC to retain 
editorial control and manage the user experience. The BBC also supports OTT delivery and 
to this end they have developed applications most notably the iPlayer, the BBC’s catch-up 
service. Since 2013, the BBC has started premiering some content on the iPlayer. If OTT is 
not possible, the BBC cooperates with the distributor in question and has, for instance, made 
the iPlayer available via Sky’s own catch-up proposition. Given the rising saliency of 
distribution issues for the BBC, its governing body the Trust has announced the introduction 
of a new Distribution Licence which will allow it to lay out and implement a clear 
distribution strategy, consider online and traditional distribution together, increase 
transparency of associated costs, review the Corporation’s participation in multiple FTA 
platforms, and assess the value for money of the arrangements in place (Mediatique, 2013). 
 
[p. 668] Given its popularity as mentioned, PSB content is core to cable and satellite pay-TV 
offerings. But in parallel, pay-TV platforms have thrived on exclusive premium content, 
notably films and sport. For instance in 2013, spend on sports programming grew by 19 per 
cent over the previous year and accounted for just under 60 per cent of all programme spend 
across commercial non-PSB channels (Ofcom 2014c: 159). Pay-TV players have strived to 
enhance the premium content they offer by acquiring rights to films and sports (e.g. BT), 
through content deals with other players (e.g. Virgin Media and Netflix), and by securing 
wholesale access to rival pay-TV platforms premium content (e.g. Virgin and Sky, see next 
section). For instance, BT has in recent years spent nearly £2bn on sports rights, mainly 
UEFA’s Champions League and Premier League football matches. In launching the BT Sport 
channels in August 2013, BT’s aim has been to challenge the pay-TV dominance of Sky in 
sport. But given the relatively low audience of BT Sport noted above, BT’s acquisition of 
sport programming can be interpreted as primarily a strategy to defend its broadband market 
share through bundling offers from erosion due to increased competition from Sky 
Broadband and related bundled packages. Indeed, BT’s strength is still in the broadband 
market where in mid-2014 it commanded 40 per cent of the market (7.39m subscribers 
against Sky’s 5.25m) (Informitv 2014). Similarly, in 2013, a month after a deal to offer BT’s 
sport channels to its cable subscribers, Virgin Media launched the Netflix application on its 
TiVo set-top box. The aim has been to broaden the range of premium content and increase 
the attractiveness of its platform. In July 2012, Sky launched Now TV, an OTT service 
 initially offering just films and subsequently sports on a subscription or transactional (pay-as-
you-go) basis. This is the first time Sky has unbundled Sky Movies and Sky Sports. Sky Now 
is a response to growing competition from YouView and other OTT services and is aimed at 
extending Sky’s distrbituion footprint to users with no subscription TV. Still, with a meagre 
6.2 per cent of the subscription VoD market in volume in 2013, Sky’s Now TV has yet to 
challenge the dominance of Amazon and Netflix (EAO, 2015: 172). 
 
Pay-TV platforms support closed technologies that allow them to control access to the 
consumer, shape the user experience and, importantly, track user behaviour. Proprietary 
technologies allow the manufacturer (e.g. Apple) or platform controller (e.g. Virgin and Sky) 
to assume a gatekeeping role and pre-approve the content, services and applications that users 
can access (OECD 2013: 24-26). Moreover, vertical integration, as is the case of Sky, allows 
market players to increase their market power by controlling all segments of the value chain. 
Finally, in recent years, commercial players have launched triple-play bundle offers (a single 
player provides television, broadband Internet and voice telephony) in an attempt to lock in 
subscribers. For instance, two Internet service providers, BT and TalkTalk have used the 
YouView platform to strengthen their triple-play business model, drive usage of their 
broadband networks, and provide an outlet for any content they might acquire, as is the case 
of BT and sport rights. Competition is heating up and convergence is becoming evident as the 
worlds of television and the Internet are getting closer and as the distinctions between a 
traditional fixed or mobile telecommunications operator and a traditional media operator are 
blurred. In 2015, BT agreed to buy mobile operator EE (owned by Deutsche Telekom and 
Orange) for £12.5bn which, pending regulatory approval, will allow BT to offer quad-play 
packages by adding mobile telephony. Sky has opted for the less expensive option of acting 
as a Mobile Virtual Network Operator which means Sky has opted for the less capital 
intensive option of using the network of an existing mobile network operator (Telefonica’s 
O2) rather than an expensive investment in an own cellular mobile network. Sky plans to 
launch quad-play offers in 2016 (Mance and Thomas, 2015). 
 
Consumption of online content has grown very slowly. As of 2013, it stood at 10 per cent, out 
of which half was on-demand catch-up services notably the BBC iPlayer, 3 per cent 
represented downloaded or streamed content such as Netflix or Amazon Prime Video, and the 
 remaining 2 per cent short video clips (Ofcom 2014c: 10). In other words, non-linear 
consumption is growing incrementally and complementary to, not substituting, linear TV.  
 
The hold of the two traditional pay-TV platforms (cable and satellite) is likely to increase in 
the medium to long term (e.g. Mediatique 2014). This scenario looks more plausible if plans 
to further squeeze digital terrestrial spectrum to the sub-700 MHz UHF band in order to 
accommodate demands by the mobile industry materialise (see Ofcom, 2015). A weakened 
DTT platform will strengthen the role of content aggregators and pay-for proprietary 
platforms (satellite and cable) and result in powerful gatekeepers. It will also put at risk the 
considerable investment in original content undertaken by PSBs which is sustained by the 
DTT platform, the main distribution platform for PSBs. There exists a ‘virtuous circle’, 
rooted in the analogue television era, whereby public service broadcasters are guaranteed free 
or low cost access to the terrestrial distribution platform and the significant reach and large 
audience this platform affords in order that they fulfil certain public service obligations, 
notably investment in original quality content (HoL, 2013, para. 154). As certainty over 
access to this spectrum and the DTT platform with its benefits is threatened, the risk is that 
this virtuous circle will be disrupted and investment in UK originated content will be 
jeopardised as a result.  
 
All the above point to the continuing and increasing need for regulatory oversight over 
traditional (terrestrial, satellite and cable) and non-traditional (online and on-demand) 
distribution matters in the context of the dynamic relationship between content providers and 
distributors. They concern a variety of issues including carriage fees (e.g. retransmission fees 
on traditional platforms and the debate on network neutrality in IP delivery), the supply of 
content to rival platforms, and the findability and prominence of content on electronic 
programme guides and similar listing and navigation facilities. Some of these issues are 
examined in the next section. 
 
 
[p. 669] 3. The Regulation of UK Television Distribution  
 
3.1 Public Service Broadcasters and Retransmission Fees  
 
 The introduction of digital television during the late 1990s was accompanied by regulatory 
initiatives, at both the European Union (EU) and UK level, designed to remove the possibility 
of any abuse of control of ‘gateway’ technologies by dominant delivery platforms (Michalis, 
2007; Smith 2007). Perhaps most significantly, in accordance with the EU’s regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services directive, Ofcom’s 
Provision of Technical Platform Services (TPS) guidelines aim to ensure that broadcasters are 
offered access for their channels to Sky’s digital satellite platform on ‘fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms’ (FRND) (Ofcom, 2006). For the most part, however, agreements 
between broadcasters for carriage on delivery platforms, including Sky Digital, are 
commercially negotiated and payments can flow in both directions (Ofcom, 2014a: 119-120). 
On the one hand, ‘content fees’ are habitually made by delivery platforms to broadcasters in 
order to secure the presence of particular channels (or aggregated content), usually on a (few 
pence) per subscriber basis (Horsman, 1997: 155-21). On the other, broadcasters pay 
‘platform charges’ to secure access to delivery platforms and/or to cover specific technical 
costs, such as regionalisation and the provision of electronic programme guide services 
(EPGs). The latter is a significant commercial and regulatory issue in its own right. For 
example, when Sky reorganised its Sky Digital EPG, it was reported that a number of 
channels, including Viacom’s MTV and Comedy Central, paid as much as £3.5 million over 
five years to move to a more attractive position (Bulkley, 2011). These commercial 
negotiations are carried out under the auspices of Ofcom’s specific Code of Practice on 
Electronic Programme Guides, which requires services to be offered on a FRND basis and 
ensure ‘due prominence’ for the main (BBC1 and 2, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5), but not 
all (e.g. BBC4, ITV2, E4 and Five USA), channels offered by PSBs (Ofcom, 2004). Partly as a 
result, the positioning of the BBC’s children’s channels, Cbeebies and CBBC, on the second, 
rather than the first, page of Sky Digital’s EPG has been a contentious issue between the 
BBC and Sky (Neilan, 2012).  
 
More significantly, this dispute over the positioning of channels on Sky Digital’s EPG can be 
seen as part of a wider conflict between PSBs and the operators of the UK’s leading pay-TV 
platforms, Sky and Virgin Media, over the distribution of their channels and services. As 
ever, disagreement has centred on who pays who and how much. However, in the case of the 
main public service channels, negotiations are also framed by long standing rules designed to 
ensure the widespread availability of these channels. Specifically, the 1988 Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act exempts cable providers from having to pay content fees to carry 
 public service channels and the 2003 Communications Act includes ‘must carry’ and ‘must 
offer’ obligations. To date, Ofcom has not needed to introduce a directive bringing the ‘must 
carry’ obligation into effect and ‘must offer’ obligations are subject to the need to agree terms 
in accordance with Ofcom’s TPS Guidelines (Ofcom, 2014a: 121). Partly as a result, the 
impact, if any, these regulations have had on negotiations between public service 
broadcasters and pay-TV platform operators is difficult to gauge. What is more clear is that, 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s, when digital television services were introduced, the 
immediate success of Sky’s satellite platform, together with the uncertainty surrounding the 
future of digital terrestrial television, placed Sky in a powerful position in its negotiations 
with PSBs. Against this backdrop, to guarantee the continued widespread availability of their 
channels, the BBC and ITV each ended up paying Sky a negotiated yearly fee (in the region 
of £10m-£20m each) for carrying their channels on Sky Digital (Mediatique, 2012: 12). 
 
Over the last decade or so, however, two of the key market developments detailed above have 
combined to strengthen the bargaining position of PSBs. First, the unprecedented success of 
Freeview has greatly reduced the possibility of a loss of universal availability for PSBs in the 
digital era. Second, while the audience share of the PSBs main channels has slowly declined 
over the last ten years, it has also become increasingly apparent that public service 
broadcasters continue to provide, by some distance, the most popular channels and VoD 
services available to UK viewers (see above). At around the same time, PSBs have also faced 
significant financial pressures caused by threats to their main sources of revenue. In 2010, as 
part of the newly elected Conservative led coalition government’s plans to cut public 
spending, the BBC agreed to accept major cuts to its own funding, requiring it to make 
annual savings of around £700m for the next five years 2015/16 (Kanter, 2013). Furthermore, 
audience fragmentation and the growth of the Internet, has meant that commercially funded 
PSBs have faced much reduced revenue from advertising. Although partially offset by 
income gained from their additional digital (portfolio) channels, between 2008 and 2013, the 
commercial PSBs, have seen net advertising revenues for their main channels fall by £505m 
in real terms (Ofcom, 2014a: 36).  
 
Against this background, it is no surprise that PSBs have become increasingly focused on 
securing more favourable terms for the delivery of their channels via pay-TV delivery 
platforms, particularly Sky. To begin with, in 2003, the BBC, opted to transmit its channels 
‘in the clear’ via satellite, which removed the need for conditional access services provided 
 by Sky and enabled it to negotiate a reduced ‘platform fee’ for EPG and regionalisation 
services. The BBC’s example was almost immediately followed by ITV and then, in 2008, by 
both Channel 4 and Channel 5, paving the way for the launch of the free-to-air satellite 
television platform, Freesat (Mediatique, 2012: 13). Just as, if not more significantly, PSBs 
have also repeatedly called for regulatory change to facilitate a shift from fees being paid by 
PSBs to pay-TV delivery platforms to the payment of ‘retransmission fees’ by pay-TV 
platforms to PSBs. The case for change was most clearly articulated by the then BBC director 
general, Mark Thompson, in his 2010 Mac Taggart memorial lecture, where he contrasted the 
billions invested in original programme production by PSBs with Sky’s annual programme 
budget (excluding sport) of around £100m. Following on from this, Thompson concluded 
that, as in the United States, broadcasters who invest most in original [p. 670] content, and 
whose channels as a result are the most popular, should receive payments from distributors 
who depend on the presence those channels. As a publicly funded broadcaster, Thompson 
argued that BBC services should always be available via all delivery platforms without a re-
transmission fee, but that the Corporation should not have to pay ‘platform fees’ either. 
However, for commercially funded public service broadcasters, Thompson concluded, 
retransmission fees could provide a valuable source of additional funding and, in turn, 
increase investment in original programme production (Thompson, 2010).       
 
The PSBs case for retransmission fees received partial political support from the UK 
government. In 2012, the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) published an 
independent report it had commissioned on the issue (Mediatique, 2012). This report 
concluded that the ‘current arrangements’ benefit platform operators more than public service 
broadcasters and that ‘changes might be warranted’ (Mediatique, 2012: p.6). It also estimated 
that if carriage on pay-TV delivery platforms was freely negotiated by commercial PSBs 
(with a back stop ‘must carry’ obligation on platform operators, but no ‘must offer’ 
obligation on broadcasters) then broadcasters could receive payments ranging from £10m to 
£190m a year (Mediatique, 2012: p.6). However, to date at least, the government has stopped 
short of supporting retransmission payments for PSBs. Instead, as part of a wide-ranging 
consultation document, the DCMS has proposed a compromise of ‘zero net charges, where 
the fees for access to the main platforms and for PSB channels cancel each other out’ 
(DCMS, 2013: 26).  
 
 This proposal would fulfil the demands of the BBC and also has tacit support from Sky. At 
least partly in an attempt to lessen the need for regulatory change, from 2012, Sky has 
markedly reduced its annual platform charges for both the BBC (from £10m to £6m and then 
to £.4.4m) and the commercial PSBs (Farber, 2012). Furthermore, most recently, in a move 
that reflects the growing commercial power of PSBs, Sky agreed ‘zero net charges’ 
distribution deals with both the BBC and ITV, which incorporated the provision of the BBC’s 
iPlayer service and other digital portfolio channels (Farber, 2014). However, the UK 
government’s ‘zero net charges’ proposal has failed to satisfy the commercial PSBs. Perhaps 
most notably, Channel 4’s chief executive, David Abraham, has claimed that securing 
retransmission fees from pay-TV platforms could be worth up to £200m each year to 
commercial PSBs (Campbelli, 2014). Unsurprisingly, this claim has been rejected by both 
Sky and Virgin Media, but, at the same time, the latter’s parent company, Liberty Global, has 
been prepared to pay £481m for a 6.4 per cent stake in ITV. At least in part, this move can be 
seen as an attempt to minimise any future retransmission fees to be paid to ITV (Evens, 
2014).  
 
Admittedly, there are some risks associated with the deregulation of PSB distribution 
negotiations. As Sky has pointed out, deregulation would increase the risk of ‘black outs’, 
where channels are withdrawn when negotiations between distributors and broadcasters fail 
to reach an agreement (McWilliam, 2014). Furthermore, unlike the regionally focused 
markets of the USA, in the UK, broadcasters and major pay-TV platforms operate and 
negotiate carriage on a nation-wide basis, which would make the potential impact of black-
outs far more significant (Ofcom, 2014a: 121; see also DCMS, 2015). In addition, there is 
also a danger that the any revenue gained by commercial PSBs would be returned to 
shareholders, rather than invested in increased programme production. However, these 
potential risks could be minimised by regulatory oversight. For example, an approach similar 
to Ofcom’s existing TPS regulation could lessen the likelihood of black outs and the level of 
investment in original programming could be monitored as part of Ofcom’s more general 
licensing and regulation of commercial PSBs. If policy makers and/or regulators are 
committed to sustaining (and increasing) the level of investment in original British 
programming, then regulatory change to favour PSBs in their negotiations with pay-TV 
platforms, at least in part, represents a means to achieve this objective.   
 
3.2 The Regulation of the Wholesale Pay-TV Market  
  
Sky’s position as a highly successful vertically integrated broadcaster-distributor has also 
repeatedly placed it at the centre of commercial and regulatory disputes over the supply of 
key content to pay-TV delivery platforms. In fact, over the last couple decades, Sky’s 
position in the UK pay-TV industry has been subject to near constant investigation by 
competition regulators. Perhaps most notably, two major investigations have been undertaken 
by the OFT (1996; 2002), as well as a lengthy review of the pay-TV market by Ofcom 
(2010), which is itself currently the subject of a review by the regulator (Ofcom, 2014b). 
Broadly speaking, these investigations have examined: first, whether Sky can be said to have 
a dominant position in the UK pay-TV market; and, secondly, whether there is evidence that 
Sky has abused a dominant position so as to lessen competition in the market(s). Given the 
phenomenal commercial success of Sky since around the mid-1990s, on the issue of market 
dominance there has been little to debate. The OFT’s (1996) review of the wholesale pay-TV 
market and its (2002) Competition Act investigation both pointed out the dominant position 
of Sky within the UK pay-TV market. In particular, the OFT’s investigations highlighted the 
significance of Sky’s dominant position in the market for the wholesale supply of certain 
premium sports and film channels, which, in turn acted as a significant ‘barriers to entry’ for 
any potential competitors (OFT, 2002, 5).  
 
The issue of whether Sky has abused its dominant position within the UK pay-TV market has 
proved much more controversial. The OFT’s investigations into the wholesale pay-TV 
market considered a number of complaints from cable broadcasters over their treatment by 
Sky. Perhaps most seriously, the cable broadcasters alleged that Sky exercised a ‘margin 
squeeze’ on the distribution of its premium channels (OFT, 2002, 2). Following its 1996 
review, the OFT concluded that Sky had not acted anti-competitively and agreed some 
‘informal undertakings’ with the broadcaster regarding its future relationship with cable 
operators (OFT, 1996, 17). By 2002, the OFT’s position was less clear cut. While the 
regulator concluded that there were ‘insufficient grounds for finding that Sky had abused a 
dominant position’ (OFT, 2002a, 10), the OFT’s [p. 671] Director General, John Vickers, 
described Sky’s conduct as ‘around the borderline of anti-competitive behaviour’ (OFT, 
2002b). A few years later, Ofcom reached a less generous conclusion. Following an 
exhaustive (2007-10) review of the UK pay-TV market, Ofcom concluded that Sky had 
‘market power in the wholesale provision of premium channels’ and ‘exploits this market 
power by restricting the distribution of its premium channels to rival pay TV providers’ 
 (Ofcom, 2010b). To remedy the situation, Ofcom announced the establishment of a 
‘wholesale-must-offer’ (WMO) system, which compelled Sky to offer its premium sports 
channels (Sky Sports 1 and Sky Sports 2) to other outlets on a wholesale basis at prices 
regulated by Ofcom. Since then, Ofcom’s decision has been subject to (a still ongoing) legal 
challenge from Sky, but ‘interim relief measures’ put in place by the Competition Appeals 
Tribunal guaranteeing the supply of Sky Sports 1 and 2 to Sky’s main rival pay-TV 
platforms, including Virgin Media, TopUp TV, and BT (via DTT and IPTV from 2014, but 
not OTT), have meant that the WMO has been, at least partially, in place since 2010.  
 
Ofcom’s current review of the WMO has highlighted a number of issues that are important to 
an understanding of the wholesale pay-TV market and its regulation. To begin with, Ofcom 
has attempted to identify the key content that may be used as a source of market power by a 
dominant broadcaster (or vertically integrated broadcaster-distributor, such as Sky). This has 
proved to be reasonably straightforward. Around the world, pay-TV broadcasters have, with 
varying degrees of success attempted to use premium content, such as Hollywood movies and 
exclusive live coverage of major sporting events/competitions to attract subscribers. 
Furthermore, the enormous sums paid by broadcasters for sports rights in the UK (and 
beyond) suggests that sports rights are valued particularly highly by pay-TV operators (Evens 
et. al, 2013). More specifically, in the UK market, the exclusive live rights for Premier 
League (PL) football have proved by far the most valuable set of rights. In February 2015, the 
PL agreed a record £5.1bn deal for the sale of three seasons of live domestic television rights 
to Sky and BT (Premier League, 2015). Furthermore, the value placed on PL football by pay-
TV broadcasters has also been supported by Ofcom’s own research. According to Ofcom, 
live PL coverage is considered ‘essential’ by 60 per cent of subscribers to Sky and/or BT 
(Ofcom, 2014: 39). Put simply, live PL football is the key content within the UK pay-TV 
market.   
     
The second major issue addressed by Ofcom was the impact that a restricted supply of such 
key content would have on competition in the pay-TV market. To assess this issue, Ofcom 
analysed the ownership of the rights to key content, most notably PL football, alongside the 
market position of the rights holders. As noted above, the UK rights to live PL football are 
currently shared between Sky and BT, but with Sky having the rights to many more matches 
per season than BT (126 and 42 respectively) (Premier League, 2015). However, as 
previously mentioned, since 2012, BT has invested considerable sums in television sports 
 rights, including around £900 million for the exclusive rights to UEFA Champions League 
(previously broadcast by Sky and ITV) and Europa League matches, for three seasons from 
2015/16 (Gibson, 2013). Nevertheless, Sky remains by some distance the UK’s leading buyer 
and supplier of sports content. Sky’s share of expenditure on sports rights in 2013/14 was 
over 60 per cent of all sports rights expenditure, in comparison to BT’s less than 20 per cent, 
and around 20 per cent from free-to-air broadcasters (Ofcom, 2014b: 51-2). Just as if not 
more significantly, between 2009-2013, Sky’s share of the total revenue from the supply of 
sports channels was consistently in excess of 90 per cent, and has declined by just 6 per cent 
since BT Sport entered the market (Ofcom, 2014b: 51). On this basis, it is difficult to argue 
with Ofcom’s conclusion that rival pay-TV platforms which ‘are unable to offer the key 
sports content available on Sky Sports may face difficulties in competing’ in the UK pay-TV 
market (Ofcom, 2014b: 59). By contrast, given its relatively weak market position, Ofcom 
has argued that, even after its investment in UEFA football rights, the impact of a decision by 
BT to limit the supply of BT Sport would prove much less significant and could even have 
the positive long term effect of allowing BT to develop into a more effective competitor for 
Sky (Ofcom, 2014b:59).  
 
Finally, Ofcom’s WMO review examined the likelihood of the limited distribution (i.e. a 
refusal to supply, or the supply on unfavourable commercial terms) of key content. For a 
dominant vertically integrated broadcaster-distributor, like Sky, a key strategic decision is 
whether to maximize revenue through the wholesale distribution of channels/content to 
potentially rival delivery platforms, or whether to limit supply in order to promote the take-up 
of its own delivery platform, even if this means the loss (at least in the short term) of some 
additional revenues that could have been secured from a wholesale supply deal. The balance 
of this decision is likely to vary according to the market position of both the vertically 
integrated broadcaster-distributor and the rival delivery platform. For example, Ofcom details 
how Virgin Media’s relatively high subscriber base means that Sky has a ‘strong incentive’ to 
supply key content to Virgin Media, as limited distribution would lead to a significant loss of 
revenue (Ofcom, 2014b: 67). By contrast, in the case of rival pay-TV platforms with a 
smaller subscriber base, such as BT, the losses from limited distribution would be far less 
significant. Furthermore, if the rival delivery platform, like BT, is seen as a strategic threat in 
the market for sports rights and pay-TV more generally, there would also be a strong 
incentive for Sky to limit the supply of key content to BT (Ofcom, 2014b: 67). On the basis 
 of this analysis, Ofcom concluded that it may be ‘appropriate to maintain regulation on Sky 
with the objective of ensuring fair and effective competition’ (Ofcom, 2014b: p.73). 
 
Albeit operating from a much weaker position in the pay-TV market, BT is also a vertically 
integrated broadcaster-distributor and is therefore faced with a similar strategic decision over 
whether to wholesale supply its key content (i.e. its BT Sport channel(s)) to rival delivery 
platforms. For BT, the significant loss of revenue that would accrue from limited distribution 
to established pay-TV platforms, such as Sky and Virgin Media, provides a strong incentive 
to reach wholesale supply deals with these platforms. However, the situation is much less 
clear in relation to smaller pay-TV platforms, such as Talk Talk (YouView), especially given 
that Talk Talk’s offers a combined pay-TV and broadband service which may be considered 
as a rival to that offered by BT. Indeed, Ofcom points out that, to date at least, BT has opted 
not to supply BT Sport to the Talk Talk You View platform (Ofcom, 2014b: 68-70). It is 
somewhat of surprise therefore that Ofcom has concluded that [p. 672] ‘it is not minded to 
consider that regulation of BT is necessary to ensure fair and effective competition in pay TV 
at this time’ (Ofcom, 2014b: 75). To some extent this decision could be justified by an 
underlying desire to facilitate the long term growth of a more meaningful rival for Sky in the 
UK pay-TV market. At the same time, however, this recommendation also highlights the 
limitations of a piecemeal approach to the regulation of the supply of key content in the 
wholesale pay-TV market. The establishment of legal guidelines for the supply of key content 
on FRND terms, in the same vein as Ofcom’s existing TPS guidelines, may offer a more 
satisfactory long term solution to the regulation of the supply of key content to a variety of 




The aim of this article has been to highlight the growing commercial and regulatory 
significance of content provider – distributor relations within the contemporary media and 
communications industry. It has focused on television distribution in the UK and has 
analysed two regulatory issues: first, the payment of retransmission fees between PSBs and 
Sky; and second, the question of whether Sky should be required to offer some of its 
premium content to rival pay-TV platforms. Both of these issues have been the subject of 
protracted (and still ongoing) legal and political debate, which suggests that dominant 
commercial interests will do all they can to avoid (and/or limit the impact of) regulatory 
 intervention. Clearly, to achieve public interest objectives, the regulation of content provider 
– distributor relations will require both political will and constant regulatory oversight. In the 
case of UK television, the UK government has threatened, but to date at least, stopped short 
of legislative change to ensure improved terms for PSBs from the distribution of their 
channels. However, even the threat of legal change has brought clear financial benefits for 
PSBs. With the introduction of a WMO obligation on the supply of Sky’s premium sports 
channels, Ofcom has demonstrated how regulatory intervention can enhance competition 
within pay-TV, but in all likelihood, a less piecemeal and more strategic approach to the 
regulation of the supply of key content will be required in future. Nevertheless, taken 
together, these examples highlight the impact regulatory intervention can have on the balance 
of power between broadcasters and distributors. This underlying point has a resonance well 
beyond the case of UK television.   
 
The issues examined here have strong parallels with debates in the Internet environment. The 
debate over retransmission fees on traditional platforms has strong similarities to the debate 
on network neutrality in IP delivery. The latter is rapidly becoming a commercial negotiation 
about the distribution of value and money between content and Internet access providers. 
Similarly, debate over prominence on electronic programming guides is very similar to that 
on Internet search and navigation. Yet, despite the parallels between content providers and 
distributors in the television and Internet industries, it seems that two cases are going in 
opposite directions (Flores, 2014). As detailed here, in broadcasting, the balance of power 
may be seen to have begun to tilt in favour of content providers (always in relative terms 
since there are strong interdependencies between the two negotiating parties). In contrast, in 
the case of the Internet, there is evidence from the USA that the outcome of the negotiations 
between content and carriage providers is going in the opposite direction. For example, in 
2014, Netflix in the USA agreed to pay Comcast, the biggest cable TV and Internet 
broadband provider, for direct interconnection of its video servers to Comcast’s network 
(Rayburn, 2014). Thus, in contrast to recent developments in the television market, in the 
Internet case content providers are beginning to pay Internet access providers and therefore 
(again without wanting to stretch this argument given the two-sided nature of the market) it 
appears that in the case of the Internet the balance of power is tilting in favour of the Internet 
access providers. 
 
 What matters here is less which way the balance of power between content providers and 
distributors is shifting and more what is at stake. Despite technological and underlying 
economic differences between the television and Internet markets, in both cases, content 
provider-distributor commercial negotiations concern not only the distribution of value and 
money in the value chain (commercial and economic efficiency considerations) but they 
relate to fundamental public policy issues too, including access to diverse content and 
information, their funding, and freedom of expression. A related common issue is free and 
open access by content suppliers to potential consumers (Waterman and Choi, 2011: 972). 
Distributors have a so-called ‘termination monopoly’ which means that they control access to 
consumers and their market power is strengthened by the lack of competition in the relevant 
market. For example, as noted above, BT’s market power in the retail and even more in the 
wholesale broadband market as well as the increasing bundling of services (triple- and quad-
play offers) by providers makes it more difficult for consumers to switch providers.  
 
The parallels (and overlaps) between the issues raised in relation to television and Internet 
regulation highlight the ever increasing need for political and regulatory oversight of 
distribution matters. While commercial negotiations between content providers and 
distributors may often seem to rest on the finer points of corporate strategy and/or economic 
analysis, it should always be remembered that, just as in other areas of public policy, 
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